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RESUMO 
O regime de meta de inflação se tornou dominante na formulação de políticas dos bancos centrais nos últimos 15 
anos. A teoria subjacente, particularmente a regra de Taylor, pode ser vista como uma competente generalização 
desse comportamento. De um ponto de vista keynesiano, ele será aceitável se encararmos a taxa de juros de 
equilíbrio como apenas uma ‘convenção variável’ e se a combinarmos ou com uma taxa de câmbio ou com uma 
meta de emprego. No caso do Brasil, porém, além dessa ressalva teórica e da condição do duplo mandato, o 
regime de metas de inflação enfrenta um problema de incoerência. Esta é uma política que se destinava a ser 
utilizada na ‘administração’ da política monetária, não na ‘mudança’ do ‘regime de política monetária’. A 
política de metas de inflação foi introduzida no Brasil em 1999 como um substituto para a âncora cambial, que 
havia sido usada desastrosamente entre 1995 e 1998. Durante muitos anos, o país havia enfrentado uma 
armadilha de alta taxa de juros / taxa de câmbio valorizada e, portanto, precisava mudar seu regime de política 
monetária antes de eventualmente adotar o regime de meta de inflação. Essa mudança, que começou com a 
flutuação de janeiro de 1999, deveria ter sido completada com reformas específicas (fim da indexação dos 
serviços públicos e dos próprios juros básicos). No entanto, em lugar de desenvolver uma estratégia para reduzir 
a taxa de juros, o governo continuou a definir a inflação como o principal problema a ser enfrentado e adotou 
uma política formal de metas de inflação. A conseqüência é que desde 1999 essa política se tornou o obstáculo 
que a economia brasileira enfrenta para escapar da armadilha da taxa de juros. 
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ABSTRACT 
Inflation Targeting become dominant in central banking policymaking over the last 15 years. The theory behind 
this framework, particularly the Taylor rule, may be seen as an able generalization of such behaviour. On a 
Keynesian point of view, it will be acceptable if we see the equilibrium interest rate as just a ‘changing 
convention’, and if we combine it with either an exchange rate or an employment target. In the case of Brazil, 
besides this theoretical caveat and the double mandate condition, inflation targeting faces an inconsistency 
problem. This is a policy designed for the purpose of ‘managing’ monetary policy, not for ‘changing’ the 
monetary policy regime. Inflation targeting policy was introduced in Brazil in 1999 as a substitute for the 
exchange rate anchor, which had been disastrously used between 1995 and 1998. For years, the country had been 
facing a high interest rate/evaluated exchange rate trap, and, so, needed to change its monetary policy regime 
before eventually adopting IT. Yet, instead of developing a strategy to reduce the interest rate, the government 
continued to define inflation as the main problem to be faced, and adopted a formal inflation targeting policy. 
The consequence is that, since 1999, such policy has been the obstacle that the Brazilian economy faces to escape 
from the interest rate trap. 
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1 1    I In nf fl la at ti io on n   t ta ar rg ge et ti in ng g   i in n   B Br ra az zi il l: :   A A   K Ke ey yn ne es si ia an n   a ap pp pr ro oa ac ch h   
Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira and Cleomar Gomes da Silva
♣ 
 
Since the beginning of 1999, when the floatation of the Real implied the abandonment of 
the exchange rate anchor, monetary authorities have adopted inflation targeting (henceforth IT) as 
the new nominal anchor, as if Brazil could not dispense with an anchor. Usually seen as a 
successful policy in so far as the inflation rate has been kept reasonably under control, IT policy 
has shown problems related to the achievement of its objectives and, principally, to the high 
fiscal and development costs involved. These problems are due to two main reasons. On one side, 
the Taylor rule in which is based (a rule that relates the inflation target with the interest rate given 
the product gap) can only be accepted if it is combined with the consideration of other variables 
such as exchange rate and employment rate. The argument that the central bank can only have 
one target because monetary authorities have only one instrument is neither reasonable nor 
realist. In practice, central banks do not work in this way. The second one is related to a grave 
inconsistency dilemma. An IT policy is designed to ‘manage’ monetary policy, not to ‘change’ 
the ‘monetary policy regime’: it orients the policymaker to define the interest rate within a 
limited range, not to face an interest/exchange rate trap, characterized by an extremely high 
interest rate and an overvalued Real, prevailing in Brazil for many years. An IT system implies in 
itself a monetary regime, and, so, it could be viewed as a ‘regime’, but we reserve the expression 
to designate inflation, interest rate and exchange rate patterns and the correspondent policies used 
to control such variables that possess a reasonable internal consistency. Monetary policy regimes 
persist for some time, but, in given moments, must undergo changes in order to deal with internal 
problems, or because new structural facts impose changes. The IT system was adopted in Brazil, 
                                                 
♣ Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira is emeritus professor of Getulio Vargas Foundation; Cleomar Gomes da Silva 
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in 1999, ignoring that a previous reform of the monetary policy regime was required involving 
the end of indexation of public services and the de-linkage between the short and the long term 
interest rate. The result is that the government does not have any clear strategy to reduce the 
interest rate and it is far from starting a serious reform package and a deep fiscal adjustment. This 
makes IT performance problematic, as it does not have the tools to circumvent the monetary 
traps, which are difficult – but not impossible – to be overcome, as we will see in this article. 
Several works have analyzed the IT framework in Brazil. For instance, Bogdanski, Tombini & 
Werlang (2000) wrote about the phase prior to implementing the plan itself and its first steps. 
Figueiredo, Fachada & Goldestein (2002) examined the conduct of monetary policy in Brazil and 
the relationship among three important elements: inflation targeting, public debt management and 
open market operations. Minella et alli. (2003) studied the Brazilian inflation targeting policy and 
argued that emerging market economies may show high volatility in their main economic 
variables (exchange and interest rates, output growth rate and inflation rate), which brings 
problems to the system as a whole. As a result, conducting monetary policy in these countries is 
closely related to challenges such as: trust building, reduction of the inflation rate, resolution of 
fiscal, external and financial dominances. As inflation in 1999, after the exchange rate floatation, 
was smaller than many predicted, the quoted authors conclude that “the Brazilian experience has 
been a successful stress test for the inflation targeting framework.” It means that they credited to 
the IT policy adopted in July (when the inflationary effects of the depreciation had already 
worked out) an outcome that was not due to the IT being implemented. This practice of 
overestimating the outcomes of the IT policy has been usual among conventional-orthodox 
economists who commemorate the low inflation indexes without considering that such results 
depend heavily on the overvaluation of the Real. Actually, the countries that adopted IT systems 
did achieve neither better nor worse outcomes than the countries that do not use such tool (Ball & 
Sheridan, 2003; Arestis, Paula & Ferrari Filho, 2006). 
The aim of this paper is to offer a brief overview of the conduct of monetary policy in 
Brazil under IT, from the date of its implementation until the end of 2006, and to show that it was 
adopted in an inadequate moment. Secondly, we will criticize the IT framework, which in Brazil 
is part of a macroeconomic policy that is keeping the economy quasi-stagnant, and show that it  
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has been misused by our monetary authorities. It is not the aim of this paper to pursue a 
theoretical discussion of the IT system. Regarding this, we can say that, on a Keynesian point of 
view, IT will be acceptable if we see the equilibrium interest rate as just a ‘changing convention’, 
i.e., if we theoretically see it as an empirical generalization of the way central banks work. And, 
on practical terms, if we combine the inflation target with either an exchange rate or an 
employment target – in the case of a small country like Brazil,
1 an exchange rate parameter might 
work better. In other words, in the framework of a pragmatic IT policy, the central bank is 
supposed to have a double mandate.
2 
Although IT was able to keep inflation relatively low, our claim is that it did that with 
extremely high fiscal and development opportunity costs.
3 Nowadays, inflation could be smaller 
and growth rates much higher in Brazil if the government had not hastened to import a monetary 
policy institution before the appropriate conditions had been materialized. Thus, we are not going 
to discuss what usually is discussed in relation to IT: how ambitious should the targets be, which 
inflation index to use, which period to take into consideration, etc. These are management 
problems. We are not even debating if some kind of exchange rate target should be added, 
although it obviously should. Here, we will argue against the timing chosen for the adoption of 
the IT policy, and which are the pre-conditions for its success. We will also be offering some 
indications of how to get out of the interest/exchange rate trap in which the Brazilian economy 
remains immersed. The following section reviews the theoretical approach related to the IT 
                                                 
1 Small as it represents around 1% of the world GDP. 
2 We are speaking of a ‘parameter’, not a target, because it would not be explicit, but conventionally 
followed by the central bank and acknowledged by the financial market. Just to include explicitly the 
exchange rate in the model and opt for a long term inflation target, as proposed by Ball (2000), counting 
that, in this time, the movements of the exchange rate will be offset, is not enough. 
3 The GDP growth rate of Brazil between 1999 and 2006 was just 2.3% on average – a rate substantially 
smaller than the one achieved by similar medium income countries.  
TEXTO PARA DISCUSSÃO 158   •   ABRIL DE 2007   •   7 
framework. Section two presents an overview of the IT system in Brazil. Section three discusses 
the reason behind the high short-term interest rate in the country. Section four talks about the 
interest-exchange rate trap faced by the monetary authorities. Section five offers some solutions 
to the trap. A final section concludes the article. 
1.1.1 INFLATION  TARGETING  POLICY 
After a decade of frustrating attempts to adopt a monetary rule to control inflation, central banks 
in rich countries realized that a more practical policy had to be used in order to control directly 
the basic interest rate aiming at a low rate of inflation. This practical policy was IT. It started to 
be adopted by a number of countries in the beginning of the 1990s. New Zealand was the first 
inflation targeter, in 1990, followed by Canada (1991), UK (1992), Sweden and Finland (1993), 
Australia and Spain (1994). After that, many other nations implemented the policy, including 
Brazil in 1999. Although IT was adopted for pragmatic reasons, as a consequence of the failure 
of the monetarist model base on monetary targets, the theoretical approach often argued by 
orthodox economist to justify it is New Classical ‘credibility theory’ (Kydland & Prescott, 1977; 
Barro & Gordon, 1983). Under this theory, if monetary authorities neglect the observation of 
rules, there will be a lack of credibility in their decisions and, therefore, higher inflation rates. 
Consequently, a reliable central bank is needed in order to eliminate the so-called inflationary 
bias found in the conduct of monetary policy. Yet, this theory does not correspond to the practice 
of central banks. Adopting a historical instead of a hypothetical approach, Le Heron (2003) sees 
in the Canadian case the foundation of a new consensus on monetary policy – a Keynesian one. 
According to him, IT is in conflict with the credibility literature because it is actually based on 
confidence. There is an opposition between ‘credibility’ and ‘confidence’.
  The credibility 
approach needs the full independence of the central bank, while IT requires just an operational 
independence, with the inflation target determined by elected politicians. Instead of emphasizing 
‘rules versus discretion’, confidence emphasizes the anticipations of the economic agents, the 
behavior of financial markets and the price of assets. In a second paper (Le Heron & Carré, 
2006), the authors emphasize that central bankers do not just follow rules assuming that they, and 
all economic agents, know the true model. Instead, central bankers gain confidence in so far as 
they act reasonably, sometimes just following the rule, sometimes changing it and offering  
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justifications that economic agents understand, but always considering that structural shocks may 
require changes. In the whole process, communication and understanding are crucial to achieve 
confidence. Alan Greenspan was an example of a central banker who thought and acted 
according to the ‘confidence’ and not the ‘credibility’ principle (Blinder & Reis, 2005; Aglietta & 
Borgy, 2005). 
Some of the institutional arrangements underlying full-fledged IT are as follows: i) an 
explicit quantitative inflation target, as well as tolerance intervals established on the basis of a 
widely known price index and decided by the National Monetary Council; ii) a clear operating 
procedure implemented by the central bank; iii) a high degree of transparency and accountability 
(inflation reports, speeches and minutes) (Svensson, 1998); iv) institutional commitments with 
price stability in line with the primary objectives of a long run monetary policy goal. For Brazil, 
specifically, in case of target misses, an open letter must be issued by the central bank explaining 
the causes of the breach, the measures to be adopted to ensure that inflation returns to the 
tolerated levels, and the period of time needed for these measures to have an effect.  
But a simple target for inflation is not a solution for monetary policy actions. A set of 
rules is needed in order to detail the main guidelines for reaching the objective with as much 
economic stability as possible. These rules must use interest rates as the main monetary policy 
instrument, make sure exchange rate is flexible and also care for any significant changes in 
product or inflation. 
Regarding both the optimal inflation and interest rates, what is commonplace nowadays is 
to analyze a central bank following Taylor’s (1993) original formulation – the pragmatic equation 
known as Taylor Rule: 
  .5 .5( 2) 2 rp y p =+ + −+  (1) 
Where ‘r’ is the federal funds interest rate, ‘p’ is the inflation rate and ‘y’ is the output gap. 
In a more general form, the Taylor Rule can be the following: 
  (* ) ( l n l n ) tt t t t ir b c Y Y ππ π −= + − + −  (2)  
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where it is the nominal interest rate, πt is the inflation, ln ln tt YY −  is the output gap and π* is the 
target for inflation. In this case,  t r  is the real interest rate that prevails when  t t Y Y = ; thus, it is the 
equilibrium interest rate that is by assumption considered constant. Thus, this interest rate rule 
says that the central bank should raise the interest rate above its long run equilibrium level when 
inflation exceeds its target and when output exceeds its natural rate. Some argue that a monetary 
policy rule under IT can be jointly attached to targets for other variables, such as the exchange 
rate, as long as they have a long run consistency with the inflation target. The reason for such 
concern is that an appreciation of the exchange rate, just like an increase in the interest rate, 
reduces the interest rate but dampens economic activity (Romer, 2001).  
IT theory was not the outcome of a concern for credibility, or of a neoclassical 
hypothetical-deductive reasoning about inflation, but it is the generalization of a historical 
experience: of how central banks are behaving in order to control inflation after they gave up 
monetary targets. Good macroeconomics adopts a method that is dominantly historical (Bresser-
Pereira, 2006), the Taylor rule, which is central in IT policy, has clearly this historical and 
pragmatic origin. On its turn, central banks’ behavior is also pragmatically based on a 
combination of several inflation theories and findings, among which the Philips curve and an 
obvious confidence or credibility requirement.
4 Neoclassical credibility theories were added to 
the central bankers’ and Taylor’s intuition to make IT consistent to the neoclassical vision, but 
nothing prevents us from adding other features to make it consistent with Keynesian 
macroeconomics. 
                                                 
4 Credibility theory is either obvious or wrong. It turns wrong when policymakers offer the ‘credibility’ of 
their policies as a substitute for economic fundamentals. This was what happened, for instance, in the 
classical Latin American Southern Cone stabilization experiments of the late 1970s (Diaz-Alejandro, 
1981), or in the 1992 IMF sponsored stabilization program in Brazil.   
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1.1.2  INFLATION TARGETING IN BRAZIL: AN OVERVIEW  
The Brazilian economy changed abruptly when the Real Plan started in 1994. It was able to 
neutralize the inertial mechanism that kept inflation high despite weak demand. Although this 
neutralization was the real cause of the high inflation stabilization, an exchange rate anchor was 
additionally adopted. Keeping a quasi-fixed exchange rate from the middle of 1994 up to the 
beginning of 1999 made the country run high current account deficits and, so, highly dependent 
on the inflow of international capital and extremely vulnerable to external shocks. Such weakness 
was confirmed when several crises hit the country, causing a rapid outflow of capital as a result 
of chain reaction in the international market. The continuous loss of reserves forced the Brazilian 
government to float and accept the depreciation of its exchange rate, in January/1999.  
The floatation of the Real led policymakers, who had been used to seeing the exchange 
rate as a monetary anchor of the Brazilian economy since 1994, to fear the return of high 
inflation. They sharply raised the interest rate, despite it being very high.
5 The fear of inflation 
was not confirmed by the facts. Indeed, the increase of the inflation rate after the floatation was 
much smaller than conventional economists expected. Nevertheless, the Brazilian monetary 
authorities started to work on achieving two main goals: i) a severe control of inflation in order to 
calm down financial market expectations and construct credibility; ii) the implementation of an 
IT framework as a new nominal anchor for our economic policy. 
                                                 
5 After the implementation of the IT regime there was a reduction of the real interest rate, but, already in 
2001, when its real level continued very high, it was increased again.   
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1.1.2.1.1.1.1  Figure 1 
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Thus, six months after the adoption of a flexible exchange rate, the Central Bank of Brazil 
(CBB) put into operation a formal IT framework and set the targets for 1999 (8%), 2000 (6%) 
and 2001 (4%) (Figure 1). The Broad Consumer Price Index (IPCA)6 was selected as the 
reference measure for the targets because it could be affected by seasonal factors as well as by 
temporary shocks. The overnight Selic rate (or short-term interest rate) was chosen as the policy 
instrument and its target became a responsibility of the National Monetary Council. Tolerance 
                                                 
6 The selected price index – IPCA – covers a sample of families with personal income between 1 and 40 
minimum wages and has a broad geographical basis (Bogdanski, Tombini & Werlang, 2000).   
TEXTO PARA DISCUSSÃO 158   •   ABRIL DE 2007   •   12 
intervals of 2% percentage points7 were allowed to take into account the importance of 
uncertainty about our inflationary process and also some unexpected temporary shocks and/or 
seasonal factors. In this way, they continued to see the control of inflation as their main goal, not 
acknowledging that an extremely high basic interest rate was also a serious obstacle to a real 
macroeconomic stabilization. In other words, it was a mistaken policy agenda once the main 
problem of the Brazilian economy had ceased to be inflation to become the perverse combination 
of high interest rate and low exchange rate. But the policy was maintained, and the low increase 
in inflation in 1999 was attributed to it, although it was just beginning to be adopted. We will 
discuss these issues in more detail in the following sessions. 
 
Figure 2 

































































































































































































                                                 
7 The tolerance intervals were widened to 2.5 percentage points after 2003.  
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The exchange rate devaluation coincided with a period of slow economic growth, and this 
partially explains the behavior of inflation (Figure 2). The fact that indexation had been 
eliminated in 1994 is the main explanation for the fact. On the other hand, a reasonable control of 
government expenditures, and an increase in taxes led to a rapid growth of the primary surplus, 
which achieved 3.2% of GDP in 1999. This was combined with a strict monetary policy conduct. 
These facts, together with other important indicators, resulted in an inflation rate of just 8.9% in 
1999 (Pinheiro, Giambiagi & Moreira, 2001). 
The year 2000 was more favorable to the Brazilian economy, despite the concerns 
regarding external factors. As a result, the 6% target was reached successfully even though there 
was a continuous realignment of monitored prices by the government (Figure 5) and some 
economic growth (Figure 1). Such expansion was due to the improvement of consumers and 
firms confidence, and due to credit expansion. The latter became possible with the reduction of 
tax on credit transactions, on loan rates and on bank spreads. The public debt/GDP ratio (Figure 
3) improved in comparison to 1999 but, even so, reached the percentage of 49.43%, which was 
still a considerable amount (Figueiredo, Fachada & Goldestein, 2002).  
Figure 3 
Inflation Rate (CPI) and Debt/GDP Ratio  
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Source: Ipeadata 
In 2001, the Brazilian economy was hit by a series of unfavorable shocks, such as, the 
energy crisis, the end of the speculative bubble in stock market throughout the world, Argentina’s 
crisis and the terrorist attacks in the USA. These shocks caused a great impact on international 
market expectations and, despite the high interest rates, it was difficult to attract foreign capital. 
On the other hand, the deficit was even magnified by the outflow of capital, which was larger 
than foreign direct investment. Given this scenario, the CBB’s action was related to limiting the 
propagation of the disturbances faced by the economy, mainly related to exchange rate 
depreciation and increases in the monitored prices. In this moment, the Central Bank, which had 
correctly been lowering the interest rate since 1999, made the mistake of increasing it, even 
though it was around 9% in real terms. In this way, the monetary authorities proved to be weak as 
they acknowledged more than it should the external vulnerability of the Brazilian economy, 
called the attention foreign creditors and opened room to the balance of payments crisis that 
would happen in the end of 2001. Besides its actions on the market itself, through the interest 
rate, monetary authorities began to work with a more restrictive monetary policy, attempting to 
keep annual inflation within the tolerance interval set by the policymakers. However, such effort 
was in vain and the inflation rate reached a yearly percentage of 7.7% (Figure 2), which meant 
that the target was breached. This rise in the CPI was not the outcome of excess demand.  
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Directly, it was related to the exchange rate pass-through to the prices, and indirectly, to the rise 
of administered prices. The fiscal side of the economy deteriorated in 2001, despite the 
government primary surplus (3.75% of the GDP).  
In 2002, it was clear that the Worker’s Party candidate, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, would 
be elected president. But there were some problems. First, the market did not know his real 
intentions. Second, there was the fiscal dominance problem related to the new increase in the 
interest rate. Third, there was a persistence of a high external vulnerability expressed in a high 
foreign debt/exports ratio. All these together led to a rise on the probability of default on foreign 
debt.
8 As a result, there was a sharp increase in the interest rate on Brazilian government dollar-
denominated debt. The Real depreciated considerably against the dollar, which led to more 
inflation. 
As for the fiscal dominance phenomenon, it was due to our great dependence on foreign 
capital, which tends to flow into emerging market economies when the interest rate is high. 
Nonetheless, as real interest rates continue to raise, even those investors who trust on the 
country’s fundamentals start thinking twice. Consequently, new exchange rate depreciation can 
materialize. For that reason, an attempt to appreciate the exchange rate has an opposite effect, and 
this characterizes the so-called fiscal dominance (Bresser-Pereira & Nakano, 2002, Gomes & 
Aidar, 2004). According to Favero & Giavazzi (2005), Brazil’s experience has shown how 
default risk may have a deleterious effect on the IT framework once the economy can move from 
a regime of monetary dominance to one of fiscal dominance. Under that condition, responding to 
higher inflation with real interest rate increases leads to a real exchange rate depreciation and, 
consequently, to a further increase in inflation. If this is the case, the right instrument to decrease 
inflation is fiscal (not monetary) policy.  
After Lula’s election, in October 2002, the government decided to maintain and deepen 
the previous monetary and fiscal policies, and also to continue microeconomic institutional 
reforms. The new administration’s plans included a primary surplus objective and 
                                                 
8 The increase in exports and the improvement of the national accounts was beginning in this year but only 
became clear to creditors in 2003.  
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announcements of a reform of the social security system. As the market assessed that there would 
not be any significant policy change, there was a decrease in the probability of default, an 
appreciation of the Real, and a decrease in inflation (Blanchard, 2005).  
In 2003, with the new government in power and the orthodox conduct of monetary policy, 
Brazil’s creditors started to calm down. By the mid of the year, the improvement of the country’s 
foreign accounts and the recovery of confidence in public authorities opened an opportunity to 
the administration to engage in a strategy of lowering the short-term interest rate. Yet, the inverse 
decision was taken. The only concern was to signal to the financial markets that the priority 
continued to be the control of inflation. According to Favero & Giavazzi (2005), after taking 
office in the beginning of 2003, Lula announced  a restrictive fiscal policy, and this was enough 
to bring the economy back to ‘normal conditions’, with a rapid reduction of the country risk, 
stabilization of the exchange rate and, consequently, stabilization of inflation expectations, 
inflation itself and public debt dynamics. The interest rate, however, continued in its absurdly 
high level, and the economy stagnated, despite the extremely favorable international conditions. 
The targets for the inflation in 2003 were changed from 4% to 8.5%, and, in 2004, from 
3.75% to 5.5% (Figure 1). In addition to that, the tolerance intervals were modified from 2% to 
2.5%. The target horizon was also lengthened to two years in order for the supply shocks to be 
smoothed as much as possible. According to the CBB, the new targets would be more suitable for 
the Brazilian economy as they would help bring interest rates down, given that the cost related to 
the former targets was quite high in terms of public debt and economic growth. However, the 
decrease in the Selic rate was not enough to make the economy grow as much as it needed. 
In 2004, the Brazilian economy grew considerably (Figure 1), which was again attributed 
by the economic authorities to the ‘correct’ economic policies. In fact, it was the outcome of a 
major external adjustment that the economy underwent between 1998 and 2004 due to the joint 
effects of the depreciation of the Real as a consequence of the 1998 and 2002 balance of payment 
crises, and of a great increase in the prices of Brazilian exported goods. The economy transited 
from a current account deficit of 5% of GDP in 1998 to a 1% surplus in 2004, while the  
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investment rate was kept constant around 19%. Thus, there was an extraordinary substitution of 
domestic for foreign savings.
9 Yet, as it was to be expected, the maintenance by the CBB of the 
interest rate in its high level plus the increase in exports caused an appreciation of the exchange 
rate (Figure 4), which helped lower the inflation rate and reach the target (Figure 1).  
                                                 
9 When a country follows the growth cum foreign savings strategy, large inflows of foreign capitals take 
place, the exchange rate appreciates, and (if the investment opportunities are not particularly favorable), 
the rate of substitution of foreign for domestic savings is high (Bresser-Pereira, 2004; Bresser-Pereira & 
Gala, 2007). In this case, given the depreciation of the Real, the opposite occurred.   
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Figure 4 
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The monetary authorities started 2005 with a similar monetary policy if compared to the 
previous year, and the target was achieved. Presently, the inflation target is already defined by the 
National Monetary Council up to 2008: 4.5% yearly, and everything indicates that such target 
will be achieved. It is an inflation rate a little higher than the average of other similar medium 
income countries like Brazil, but the difference is small and can be explained by the still existing 
indexation of utilities, of wages when decided by the Labor Justice, by the policy of increasing 
the minimum wage, and by the relatively closed character of the Brazilian economy (Werlang, 
2006). Among these factors, administered prices are the main responsible for the inflation above 
international levels. According to Figure 5, between 1999 and 2003 these prices increased more 
than inflation, and after that they stabilized.
10 In 2005 and 2006, the inflation rate fell, and the 
target was achieved (Figure 1). In the end of 2006 the inflation rate was around 3% a year, and 
this rate was commemorated by conventional orthodoxy as its ‘victory’ against inflation. 
                                                 
10 This behavior (high increase and stabilization) was mainly due to the use of the General Price Index (IGP), 
instead of the Consumer Price Index, to define prices administered by contracts. Part of the IGP comes from 
wholesale price changes, which is highly related to exchange rate fluctuations.  
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Actually, this low rate was the result of exchange rate populism, since it was achieved due to a 
substantial appreciation of the Real. Given the fall in the inflation rate, the nominal interest rate 
fell, but the real interest rate remained above 10% in the beginning of 2007. Not surprisingly, the 
GDP growth rate presented a dismal rate of 2.8% (according to the last estimates of January 
2007). This is certainly a quasi-stagnant rate for the Brazilian economy given the 1.5% 
population growth. 
1.1.3  THE HIGH INTEREST RATE  
The previous overview of IT in Brazil gives us the tools necessary to make an analysis of 
the Brazilian economy in the period. We will discuss two main issues: a) the reasons why the 
interest rate is so high; b) the interest rate/exchange rate trap. Along with these topics, some 
others will be analyzed: i) the inconsistency faced by the IT system; ii) the indexation of public 
services; iii) the indexation of the basic interest rate (the Selic rate); iv) fiscal policy in Brazil; v) 
monitored prices; vi) economic growth and unemployment. In addition to that, we will propose 
some solutions to the traps. 
1.1.3.1.1.1.1  Table 1 










1999 19.00  8.94 10.06
2000 15.76  5.97 9.79
2001 19.05  7.67 11.38
2002 24.90  12.53 12.37
2003 16.32  9.30 7.02
2004 17.74  7.60 10.14
2005 18.00  5.69 12.31
2006 13.25  3.14 10.11 
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Source: Banco Central do Brasil 
Before we discuss interest rate in Brazil, we must define ‘the interest/exchange rate trap’ 
that our economy has been facing since the 1994 Real Plan. In very simple terms, it means that 
the short-term basic real interest rate does not go down below 9% a year in real terms (Table 1).
11 
It means, additionally, that long-term interest on federal bonds pays the same Selic interest rate in 
so far as the National Treasury Bonds (LTNs) are indexed by the Selic rate and are often higher 
than the interest paid by Brazilian bonds abroad.
12 Third, it means that the capital inflows, stirred 
up by this high rate, press down the exchange rate, overvaluing the Real: whenever the exchange 
rate depreciates, as it happened in the 1998 and in the 2002 balance of payment crises, it will 
soon appreciate again. It is a trap because monetary authorities fear to lower the interest rate 
below a given threshold. The IT policy reinforced the trap in the moment that it defined the 
equilibrium interest rate in its model as being around 9% a year in real terms, thus formalizing 
the threshold. When monetary authorities begin to reduce the interest rate, the exchange rate 
starts depreciating and inflation rises. It increases much before the lower interest rates could 
cause demand pressures, but, nevertheless, the CBB stops reducing the interest rate.  
Why is the interest rate so high in Brazil? Essentially because the interest/exchange rates 
trap prevents it from being reduced. A secondary cause is the high level of state expenditures 
compared to the level of income per capita of the country. Third, because our monetary 
authorities increase the Selic rate, trying (unsuccessfully) to lengthen the debt maturity (to build a 
long-term domestic credit market). Fourth, and this is probably the key reason, because the Selic 
indexes most of the public debt as it links the short term interest rate, the Selic, to the federal 
Treasury bonds (Barbosa, 2006). This is an inheritance of the times of high inflation that pushes 
policymakers to keep high the short-term interest rate for fear of not being able to rollover the 
debt. In behaving in this way, they ignore that the players in the market – the banks particularly – 
do not have alternative but to apply their short-term resources in government bonds. As Keynes 
                                                 
11 Only in 2003 it went down, averaging 7.02%. This was a recession year that followed the 2002 balance of 
payment crisis. The interest rate fell not due but despite the central bank monetary policy. 
12 In other words, they are often higher than the interest rate on T bonds plus the Brazil risk, plus the 
difference between the American and the Brazilian interest rate.  
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showed in the volume 2 of his Treatise on Money, for monetary policy to work properly, an 
adequate yield curve must exist, so that policy decisions related to short-term interest rates can be 
transmitted to the interest rates that actually influence private agents’ behaviors. In Brazil, instead 
of that, the Selic rate directly defines the long run interest rate, i.e., the rate that Brazil Treasury 
bonds pay, which is the same as to say that there is not a long-term interest rate. There is, 
however, a proxy of it: the interest rate paid by first class Brazilian corporations abroad equals 
the risk Brazil plus the interest rate on US Treasury bonds. Presently, this rate is around half 
(around 5) of the real Selic interest rate (10%). Fifth, the Selic rate is high because the CBB uses 
it as a tool to solve other sorts of problems, besides controlling inflation. For instance, it is used 
to:  i) attract foreign capital; ii) reduce the current account deficit when it is increasing 
continuously; iii) increase public savings. Sixth, we have a political economy cause, which plays 
a major role in explaining the abusive short-term interest rate in Brazil. The Selic rate is high 
because, since the end of the 1980s, the CBB has been ‘captured’ by rentiers who make profit 
with high interest rates, by the financial sector who make their living out of commissions/bonuses 
coming from rentiers, and by multinationals that increase their envoys of profits with an 
overvalued Real. Seventh, we have an ideological hegemony cause: Washington, and specifically 
the IMF, strongly supports the current Brazilian monetary policy – what is not surprising: the 
conventional orthodoxy that this agency and the international financial markets use to press 
medium income developing countries is essentially a tool to neutralize their growth (Bresser-
Pereira, 2005, 2007).  
However, what government authorities should be doing is to make the term structure of 
interest rates be the consequence of credit flows due to responsible macroeconomic policies. 
Some of them are the following: i) a rigid inflation control (as they are doing); ii) a more 
competitive exchange rate; iii) no current account deficit; iv) reduction of the debt to exports 
ratio; v) interest rate cut; vi) reduction of the public deficit with consequent reduction of the 
public debt to GDP ratio; vii) and, principally, de-linking the Brazilian Treasury bonds from Selic 
through a financial reform. These issues will be discussed more thoroughly in the fourth session. 
There are other explanations. Economists, usually related to financial markets, offer a 
series of arguments for the high interest rate that remember the fable of the wolf and the lamb.  
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The classical explanation for our high inflation rate was that Brazil’s country risk was too high. 
Yet, since 2002, Bresser & Nakano (2002) showed that this was false: countries with the same or 
worse risk classification had much smaller interest rates. Today, after the fall of Brazil’s country 
risk, which has been taking place since the beginning of 2003, the short term interest rate paid by 
the CBB, which indexes the whole public debt, is higher than the long term interest rate paid by 
Brazilian enterprises. A second argument is that the interest rate is high because the country has a 
large public debt. But such public debt is not particularly high by international standards. It is 
only extremely high if we calculate the debt of the other countries discounting their nominal 
value by the Brazilian interest rate, and in this case we fall back in the interest rate trap. A third is 
that our interest rate is high because of the high budget deficit, which is not high by international 
standards. Another explanation is that our interest rate is high because it is necessary to fight 
inflation. There is no doubt the interest rate is the right instrument to do that. But the Selic rate 
does not fluctuate between 0 and 3% in real terms, as it happens in rich countries, and not even 
between 2 and 5%, as it happens in countries with similar risk classifications. Table 1 shows the 
real Selic rate for Brazil and Table 2 reports some basic interest rates of selected countries, which 
confirms what has been said. 
A fifth explanation was offered by Arida, Bacha & Lara-Resende (2005). They presented 
as justification for the high ‘natural’ rate that would exist in Brazil, or for this ‘‘bad equilibrium’, 
the inexistence of long-term domestic credit. The failure is due to what they call ‘jurisdictional 
uncertainty’: the judiciary branch would not protect creditors effectively and such action would 
bring negative consequences to private savings and investment. It is also misinterpreted as a 
consequence of market failures deriving from restrictions to currency convertibility, artificial 
term lengthening of public debt, compulsory saving funds, and forced savings through inflation. 
Thus, the country would have to live with a short run real interest rate above 9% a year up to the 
moment that a series of institutional reforms solve these problems and create ‘jurisdictional 
certainty’. There is no doubt that a country like Brazil needs reforms. Nonetheless, the absence of 
them cannot be blamed for mistakes in the country’s macroeconomic policy and mainly for our 
extremely high basic interest rate. In the past, institutions were less developed in Brazil and, 
nevertheless, the interest rate was much smaller. Besides, the country’s institutions are quite  
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similar, if not better, to those found in countries with equivalent (or worse) risk classification but 
with much lower interest rates. Actually, the ‘jurisdictional uncertainty’ argument makes no 
sense and neither is it sustained empirically. Holland, Gonçalves & Spacov (2006) formulate a 
methodology based on Arida, Bacha & Lara-Resende’s proposal and their results are highly 
unfavorable to the jurisdiction uncertainty argument. Their findings indicate that “traditional 
monetary and fiscal factors are far more relevant to explain the level of short-term real interest 
rates than the binomial jurisdictional uncertainty/ currency inconvertibility is.” 
1.1.3.1.1.1.3  Table 2 





Rates  Country 
Real 
Interest Rates 
Brazil 11,53 Mexico  4,42 
Argentina -3,36 Peru  1,66 
Chile 1,22 Philippines  0,71 
China 0,29 Poland  3,64 




Arabia  4,22 
Egypt 5,00 Singapore  2,01 
Hong Kong  2,13
South 
Africa  3,55 
Hungary 2,86
South 
Korea  1,40 
India 1,07 Taiwan -0,55 
Indonesia -3,03 Thailand  -1,30  
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Israel 2,51 Turkey  7,01 
Malaysia -0,22 Venezuela  -1,77 
Source: The Economist (Emerging Market Indicators), February 2006. 
Real Interest Rates are short-term nominal interest rates minus consumer prices indices. 
1.1.4  THE INTEREST-EXCHANGE RATE TRAP  
Despite its high level, the movements in the basic interest rate in Brazil are quite similar to what 
is observed in other countries, that is, it increases in booms and decreases in downturns. 
However, our monetary authorities have not been able to consistently reduce this rate. And the 
result is what we call ‘the interest rate trap’. Our argument is that the Brazilian economy was not 
in conditions to adopt an IT framework as a nominal anchor. And, as it ignored such restriction, 
the trap became stronger. 
The interest rate trap can be observed in many ways. Firstly, whenever the CBB starts a 
process of interest rate reduction, the exchange rate depreciates, and the consequent changes in 
relative prices cause a rise in inflation. This is a threat to the IT framework, and the CBB reacts 
increasing the interest rate again. Thus, paradoxically, a supply-side inflation is fought with a 
policy aiming at demand contraction. Every time the interest rate is reduced and there is some 
sign of economic growth, as the current account deficit increases,
13 the government authorities try 
to avoid a depreciation of the exchange rate by raising the Selic rate and, consequently, 
increasing unemployment rates (Figure 6). Raising interest rates makes both public deficit and 
public debt to GDP ratio increase (Figure 3) and, accordingly, reduces the country’s international 
credit, unless the primary surplus is correspondingly increased, usually through an increase in the 
tax burden. 
                                                 
13 Since 1994, the current account deficit was close to zero in only one occasion - in 2002. This happened 
due to the exchange rate depreciation and a strong economic recession. However, this depreciation did 
not occur because of economic policies but because of confidence crisis. In the first half of 2003, the 
exchange rate started to appreciate again, which might make the current account deficit appear again.  
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This trap puts the country’s economy in a short-term vicious cycle. In the beginning of 
2003, for instance, the government decided to go on with the same macroeconomic policy 
adopted by the previous administration. This attitude was warmly welcomed by the monetary 
authorities in Washington and the financial market. As a consequence, credit flowed in again, the 
country risk lowered, and the exchange rate appreciated once more. But, at the same time, the 
financial market started to notice that there was no economic growth, that there were some social 
and political disturbances, and that the primary surplus began to decrease again. In other words, 
there was a clear sign that results coming from the economic policy were not the best ones. As no 
one dares to discuss the economic theory underlying the Brazilian monetary policy, the solution 
is to reduce the country’s credit with consequences in terms of increases in the country risk as 
well as in the basic interest rates. 
The exchange rate is a particularly strategic macroeconomic price and it is the other side 
of the coin of the interest rate trap. Exchange rate depreciations can have a deleterious impact on 
inflation whereas appreciations can affect negatively the national accounts via levels of exports 
and imports. A real appreciation can make domestic industry less competitive and, therefore, 
cause deficit in the current account. According to the conventional theory underlying IT, 
exchange rate targeting is likely to worsen the performance of monetary policy. Nevertheless, it 
does not mean that central banks are supposed to neglect the effects of the exchange rate 
movements on inflation and aggregate demand. In this case, the best solution is a transparent 
explanation of the exchange rate intervention as a way of mitigating potentially destabilizing 
effects of abrupt price changes (Mishkin & Schmidt-Hebbel, 2001). 
A high interest rate makes the exchange rate go down in dollar terms (or makes the real 
exchange rate appreciate) because the former is an inverse function of the latter, via uncovered 
interest parity theory. It took two balance of payments crises for the country to find a way out of 
this trap. The first one was in 1999 and the second in 2002, as discussed in Session 1. In both 
cases, the increase in inflation was moderate, much lower than the expected, and more 
importantly, it decreased as soon as there was a stabilization of the exchange rate. In 2003, this 
phenomenon was observed again. Although the government attributed the inflation decrease to a 
rise of the Selic rate, it was the appreciation of the exchange rate the main cause of the reduction  
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in inflation. But it did not last long. Figure 4 shows that the exchange rate has been appreciating 
since 2004, which can be harmful to the country’s economy in terms of exports. When the 
monetary authorities decided to intervene in the dollar market, and buy reserves, another facet of 
the interest rate & exchange rate trap turned apparent: given the extremely high real basic interest 
rate (around 15%) this policy was severely limited by its high fiscal cost. 
1.1.5  MONETARY POLICY REGIME  
Despite the low inflation rate that prevails nowadays in Brazil, our view is that the IT 
system is problematic because it contributes to maintaining our economy quasi-stagnant, and 
because the low growth rates are directly related to the fact that price stability is not the same as 
macroeconomic stability. Unemployment remains high in Brazil, the basic interest rate is 
absurdly high, and the exchange rate is overvalued. In addition to that, it co-exists with high 
interest rate and keeps the exchange rate non-competitive. The economic policy that conventional 
orthodoxy proposes to medium income countries and that the CBB faithfully adopts implies the 
overvaluation of the exchange rate. The Dutch disease and the growth with foreign savings policy 
press the exchange rate up, overvaluating it. A competent macroeconomic policy must look at 
such tendency, keeping the exchange rate competitive. Yet, as conventional orthodoxy defines 
macroeconomic stabilization as price stabilization, it uses the appreciation of the local currency 
to control inflation. It is impressive how the inflation rate accompanies the exchange rate in the 
Brazilian economy (Figure 4). Instead of viewing IT policy as a success or a failure, we should 
see it as the central tool that conventional orthodoxy uses to keep the Brazilian economy in the 
high interest rate – non competitive trap. 
The Brazilian economy was not really prepared for an IT framework given the fact that 
such policy is designed to manage monetary policy, not to change the monetary policy regime. 
An IT policy will not apply if a country needs to change the monetary policy regime due, for 
instance, to its high and inertial inflation, as Brazil was between 1980 and 1994, or due to an 
absurdly high real basic interest rate and an overvalued exchange rate, as the country has been  
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experiencing since 1994.
14 It must first solve these problems that IT has not adequate to solve. 
Actually, as argued in the paragraphs above, Brazil has been facing a high interest rate/low 
exchange rate trap since 1994, which has kept the country out its macroeconomic equilibrium. If 
the economic authorities believed that IT was a good route to be followed, they had to first face 
this trap.  
In order to put the country on the right track again several changes must be performed. 
Actually, a full strategy must be put into action. The aim is to reduce the basic interest rate (the 
Selic rate) so that it oscillates between 1% and 3% in real terms instead of between 9 and 15%. 
This reduction will only be possible with the end of the linkage of the long to the short term 
interest rate, with the en of the indexation of the federal bonds by the short term Selic rate. This 
practice is a peculiarity in Brazil (a heritage of high inflation) and it is the main institutional 
explanation for the high interest rate used to pay the service of the public debt. While the short 
and the long term interest rate remained, in 2006, around 12% a year in real terms, a proxy of the 
long term interest rate (interest on US Treasury bonds plus Brazil risk) was around 5% a year. 
Instead of conducting reforms to ends such distortions, the administration adopted in 1999 IT, 
and limits itself to manage it in the framework of an interest rate trap.  
Together with reducing the Selic rate, the Brazilian government will have to start a 
serious fiscal adjustment. We are aware that the country has been obtaining considerable primary 
surpluses via tax increases – and not via public spending cuts. But this is not enough. While the 
interest rate is getting out of the trap, the authorities will have to reduce expenditures and, 
perhaps, generate a surplus. With this adjustment, not only will the government signal its 
rejection to any sort of populism but it will also control possible inflationary processes coming 
from a possible demand shock. With the demand controlled, there is no reason in expecting any 
inflation increase, except the transitory one coming from the exchange rate depreciation. Could a 
public debt default be caused by the unconformity of domestic creditors with the lower interest 
                                                 
14 Actually, the real interest rate was high before 1994, but instable, depending on the variations of 
inflation. On its turn, as inflation was incredibly high, all attention was directed to it.  
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rates? Such danger is inexistent once the interest rate being reduced is the one related to bank 
reserves, whose only return on capital possible is the basic interest rate. 
Figure 5 
Accumulated Inflation Rate (1999:01 = 100) 
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1.1.5.1.1.1.2  Source: Ipeadata 
The reduction of the interest rate from its minimum 9% level, and of inflation from its 5% 
to 6% level will only be reached with another important reform: the end of indexation of public 
services and, more broadly, the end of any indexation of contracts and administered prices in 
which the administration is involved as a provider or as a regulator.
15 As already mentioned, the 
Broad CPI is the price index used for the definition of inflation, and the basket of administered 
                                                 
15 Administered (monitored) prices are those determined or influenced by government, either directly or 
through a government agency regardless of market forces. Some products which are part of the basket of 
administered prices are: water, electricity and sanitary fees, public transport, telephone calls, petrol, public 
transport, motor licenses and registration, health plans, postage.  
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prices amounts to 30% of the index. In terms of economic policy action, what is clearly noticed is 
that policymakers’ actions affect considerably the price index variability because of monitored 
prices. As a consequence, the targets can be reached but there are high social costs involved, low 
economic growth as well as high interest rates. Monitored prices vary independently of demand 
factors and, as Figure 5 reports, the accumulated inflation related to the monitored prices 
increased much more than the other two indices. Therefore, administered prices in Brazil bring a 
series of problems to the economy. Firstly, the CBB’s actions, via its monetary policy instrument, 
can only affect free prices, which make monetary authorities work on demand shocks that may 
times do not exist. Secondly, inflation expectations generate a vicious circle in the interest rates 
and make them extremely high. The result is that monetary policy is very restrictive and severe 
(Gomes & Aidar, 2004).  
Of course, when we say that administered prices should not be indexed, it does not mean 
that regulating agencies should neglect inflation processes in their price revisions. As their 
counterparts in other countries, the Brazilian agencies will take inflation into consideration but 
without referring to a pre-determined price index. Neither does it mean that government would 
break existing contracts: it would just be strongly motivated to renegotiate them, and 
institutionally prohibited to make new indexed contracts.  
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1.1.5.1.1.1.3  Figure 6 
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1.1.5.1.1.1.5  Source: Ipeadata 
The unemployment rate corresponds to the Sao Paulo Metropolitan Area (RMSP) only. 
Finally, government authorities should always have in mind that these policies are aimed 
at bringing economic growth and, as consequence, less unemployment and less social disparities. 
Monetary policy rules should be seen as a guideline for decision-making and not as a rigid rule. 
For the unemployment specifically, the relationship between this variable and monetary policy is 
very important. Contrary to what is argued by some conventional theorists, monetary policy 
usually has positive and long-lasting effects on real interest rates and, consequently, on economic 
activity and unemployment. In other words, it influences unemployment rates, more than what 
has been discussed in the current debate. Figure 6 plots a comparison between the rates of interest 
and unemployment for Brazil. The graph shows that the unemployment rate in Brazil is high, just 
like the interest rate, and that any interest rate increase causes more unemployment, meaning that 
the current monetary policy in Brazil brings a really high social cost (Gomes & Aidar, 2005).  
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1.1.6 CONCLUSION 
This article discussed the current inflation targeting policy adopted in Brazil and the 
interest rate/exchange rate trap the country is facing due to its high basic interest rate. Firstly, we 
made a quick overview of the monetary policy in Brazil under inflation targeting, from the date 
of its implementation until the end of 2005. Secondly, we analyzed the problems faced by the 
Brazilian monetary authorities under the argument that our inflation targeting system faces some 
important theoretical problems and, more importantly, it faces an inconsistency dilemma once it 
was designed to be used for purposes of ‘management’ of monetary policy , and not for 
‘changing’ the ‘monetary policy regime. 
The 1994 Real Plan was a successful reform that de-indexed the Brazilian economy and, 
so, neutralized inflationary inertia. Yet, it was left incomplete in so far as administered prices and 
the public debt remained indexed. However, instead of working toward this objective, the 
Brazilian monetary authorities accepted the IMF recommendation and adopted an exchange rate 
anchor between 1995 and 1998. Its outcome was catastrophic. Nevertheless, an inflation targeting 
policy was introduced in Brazil in 1999 as a substitute for such exchange rate anchor. This 
monetary reform ought to have been preceded by reforms that ended with all forms of indexation. 
Yet, instead of developing a strategy to reduce the interest rate, involving such reforms and the 
deepening the fiscal adjustment, the government continued defining inflation as the main 
problem to be faced, and adopted a formal inflation targeting policy. The consequence was that, 
since 1999, the real interest rate remained incredibly high: the Brazilian economy was unable to 
escape the interest rate trap. 
Perhaps, the best strategy should have been the search for a long term convergence of 
inflation. For instance, Chile and Mexico acted that way before introducing their respective 
inflation targeting policies. They first pursued the equilibrium of their economies and began 
releasing inflation projections with long-term aims. In other words, they allowed inflation to 
converge smoothly and the result was a much smaller social cost, when compared to Brazil. In 
the case of Chile, which is a model of competent macroeconomic policy, the entire strategy 
started to be analyzed back in 1991. However, the full adoption of a mild form inflation target  
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policy happened only in 2000, when they started releasing their inflation reports. For the Mexican 
case, the strategy was similar but in different periods. 
In the Brazilian case, there was not a proper preparation of the economy prior to the 
adoption of the system. In order to adopt the IT policy, authorities should have prepared the key 
variables of the economy in order for them to converge more smoothly. If they had, first, 
concentrated in getting rid of the interest rate/exchange rate trap in which the economy was 
immersed, they could, in a second moment, adopt an IT policy. Instead, excessively concerned 
with inflation, the authorities hastened to adopt a new nominal anchor. In consequence, the 
exchange rate remained highly unstable and the economy failed to achieve the inflation target in 
some years. Worse, the real interest rate by the public debt remained abnormally high – which 
involved high fiscal and development costs. Therefore, Brazil needs an urgent change in its 
priorities when regarding to monetary policy. Nowadays, the high interest rate, not inflation, is 
the main problem to be faced. By only solving this problem, and only lowering the interest rate to 
levels consistent to its country-risk, Brazil will be able to have international levels of inflation, 
instead of keeping it around 5% a year. To successfully perform this action, however, the 
involvement of the entire society and government will be necessary. 
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